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RICO LAW-WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND RICO CONSPIRACY 
STANDING: THE HOLMES V. SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION 
CORP. DIRECT-INJURY TEST RESOLVES THE STANDING ISSUE 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 1962( a )-( c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act ("RICO")1 makes it a violation of federal law to 
invest, maintain an interest, or participate in the affairs of an enter­
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity.2 Section 1962( d) of 
RICO also makes "[ilt ... unlawful for any person to conspire to 
violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this 
section."3 Finally, section 1964(c) of RICO provides treble dam­
ages to any person "injured in his business or property by reason of 
a violation of section 1962."4 
In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,5 the United 
States Supreme Court held that an injury occurs "by reason of' a 
1. Title IX of the. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993» 
(adopted October 15, 1970). 
2. 18 U.S.c. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988). These subsections state the following: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de­
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through 
collection of an unlawful debt ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any 
part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is en­
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce .... 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, di­
rectly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is en­
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection 
of unlawful debt. 
Id. 
3. 18 U.S.c. § 1962(d) (1988). 
4. 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1988) (emphasis added). The full text of this subsection 
states: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of 
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district 
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, in­
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. 
5. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992). 
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RICO violation only if the violation directly causes the injury.6 
Wrongfully discharged employees have argued that their injuries 
are directly caused by their former employers' conspiracies to vio­
late RICO. They seek treble damages pursuant to section 1964(c) 
in two situations. In one situation, the employee is discharged for 
refusing to participate in the racketeering activity of an employer.7 
In the other situation, the employee is discharged for "blowing the 
whistle" on an employer's racketeering activity.8 
The use of RICO's civil damages provision by wrongfully dis­
charged employees, however, rests on the edge of RICO's "direct­
injury" analysis. Is the wrongful discharge directly caused by the 
conspiracy? Should a wrongfully discharged employee's RICO suit 
survive a motion to dismiss? These questions have divided the 
United States courts of appeals, and the United States Supreme 
Court has not resolved the issue. This Note analyzes these ques­
tions and discusses the effects of the Holmes decision on the stand­
ing of wrongfully discharged employees. 
Section I discusses the elements of a RICO conspiracy, the 
type of injury which is compensable under section 1964(c), and the 
pre-Holmes wrongful discharge cases. Section II takes a closer look 
at the facts and analysis of Holmes, and examines the two post­
Holmes wrongful discharge cases in the United States courts of ap­
peals. These two cases, Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. 9 
and Bowman v. Western Auto Supply CO.,l0 demonstrate some of 
the effects of Holmes on wrongful discharge standing analysis. 
Finally, Section III further analyzes wrongful discharge under 
the direct-injury test. The direct-injury test demonstrates that the 
claims of wrongfully injured employees should survive a motion to 
dismiss when proper factual allegations are made. The validity of 
their claims should depend on these factual allegations rather than 
6. Id. at 1318. The Holmes Court reasoned that this approach follows the com­
mon law principle that proximate cause "reflects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of 
what is administratively possible and convenient.'" Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984». 
7. See infra notes 60-96 and 146-68 and accompanying text for the factual settings 
and analyses of the RICO civil actions brought by wrongfully discharged employees 
which have reached the United States courts of appeals. 
8. See supra note 7. 
9. 978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992). For a full discussion of Schiffels, see infra notes 
146-56 and accompanying text. 
10. 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993). For a full discus­
sion of Bowman, see infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text. 
1994] RICO LAW-WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND CONSPIRACY 367 

on the legal hurdles which a majority of the United States courts of 
appeals have erected. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. What Is a RICO Conspiracyll 
In United States v. Elliott,12 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit faced a criminal scheme involving six defendants, thirty­
seven un indicted co-conspirators, and over twenty different crimi­
nal endeavors ranging from arson to murder to stealing meat and 
shirts. Because traditional conspiracy law requires the proof of a 
single agreement, the Elliott court noted that the commission of 
highly diverse crimes by a large number of individuals rendered the 
defendants' prosecution for conspiracy nearly impossible,13 In 
RICO, however, the Elliott court found a new tool by which to infer 
a single agreement among diverse activities: the RICO 
"enterprise."14 
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988). See supra text accompanying note 3 for the text 
of the RICO conspiracy provision. 
12. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). 
13. Id. at 902. Traditional conspiracy law utilizes two theories for conspiracy 
prosecutions. First, the "wheel conspiracy" involves one person acting as the "hub" of a 
wheel and conspiring with several others, the "spokes" of the wheel. The awareness by 
the "spokes" of the other "spokes" serves to form a "rim" which encloses the "wheel." 
, 	 Id. at 900 (citing United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1977». Second, 
the "chain conspiracy" involves a principal actor operating through a series of middle­
men. The middlemen may not be aware of each other, but they understand that in 
order for the conspiracy to be successful, there must be several "links" in the "chain" of 
operation. Id. at 900-01 (citing Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947». 
14. Id. at 902. '''[E]nterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in 
fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). 
The Elliott court's use of the "enterprise" theory comports with the general philos­
ophy of RICO: 
It is the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the 
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering pro­
cess, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanc­
tions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in 
organized crime. 
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969). 
When the first two drafts of RICO were introduced in 1967, S. 2048 and S. 2049, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), Senator Hruska, the sponsor, defined organized crime as a 
"tightly knit and strictly disciplined criminal cartel." 113 CONGo REC. 17998 (1967). As 
the bill evolved, however, it became broader in scope. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: 
The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & ll, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661,666-73 (1987), for 
a thorough discussion of RICO's evolution. See also United States V. Turkette, 452 U.S. 
576, 586-87 (1981) (viewing Congress' language as self-consciously broad and 
expansive). 
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The Elliott court held "that, through RICO, Congress intended 
to authorize the single prosecution of a multi-faceted, diversified 
conspiracy."15 Under RICO's conspiracy provision, the Elliott 
court reasoned, the prosecution of an individual could be achieved 
if it could reasonably be inferred that the diverse crimes committed 
were intended to further an enterprise's affairs.16 This use of the 
RICO "enterprise" concept by the Elliott court has "popularized 
the notion of RICO as a super-conspiracy statute."17 
The holding of Elliott, however, has led to some disagreement 
among the United States courts of appeals. The Elliott court con­
cluded that "[t]o be convicted as a member of an enterprise con­
spiracy, an individual, by his words or actions, must have 
objectively manifested an agreement to participate, directly or indi­
rectly, in the affairs of an enterprise through the commission of two 
or more predicate crimes. "18 A "predicate" crime or act under 
RICO is one of the many offenses defined by Congress as "racke­
teering activity."19 Two or more predicate acts must be committed 
15. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902. 
16. Id. at 902·03. 
17. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 920, 949 (1987). 
See Turkette, 452 U.S. 576. In Turkette, the United States Supreme Court refused 
to limit the definition of enterprise to legitimate enterprises. The Court, therefore, up­
held the conviction of a group of individuals under the RICO conspiracy provision, 18 
U.S.c. § 1962(d), who were associated for the exclusive purpose of committing illegal 
activities. Despite noting that the major purpose of RICO was to prevent the infiltra­
tion of legitimate business by organized crime, the Court held that "neither the lan­
guage nor structure of RICO limits its application to legitimate 'enterprises.'" Id. at 
587. 
18. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 903. 
19. 18 U.S.c. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1993). Congress defines "racketeering activity" 
as: 
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, 
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other 
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by im­
prisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any 
of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relat­
ing to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 
473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate 
shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (re­
lating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (re­
lating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1029 (relating to fraud and 
related activity in connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to 
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institu­
tion fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (re­
lating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of 
criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or 
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to constitute a substantive RICO violation, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c), 
because these violations require· "a pattern of racketeering activ­
ity."20 A RICO conspiracy, therefore, is an agreement to commit 
two or more predicate acts within a single scheme. 
The disagreement among the courts of appeals concerns 
whether the individual must agree to personally commit two or 
more predicate acts. In other words, the majority of the United 
States courts of appeals hold that a RICO conspiracy is committed 
when an individual merely agrees to the commission of a pattern of 
racketeering activity in furtherance of the affairs of an enterprise.21 
The majority does not require that the individual agree to person-
local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a victim, wit­
ness, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a victim, 
witness, or an informant), section 1951 (relating to interference with com­
merce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 
1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 
1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to 
the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the 
laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in 
monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), 
section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the. commis­
sion of murder-for-hire), sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of 
children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of sto­
len motor vehicles), section 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transporta­
tion of stolen property), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor 
vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in 
contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-2424 [sic] (relating to white slave traffic), 
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 
(dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or 
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense 
involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securi­
ties, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buy­
ing, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, 
punishable under any law of the United States, or (E) any act which is indicta­
ble under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. 
Id. 
20. See supra note 2 for the full text of RICO's substantive provisions, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(a)-(c) (1988). Congress defined "a pattern of racketeering activity" as "at least 
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this 
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a 
prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.c. § 1961(5) (1988). 
In H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), the United 
States Supreme Court held that a pattern of racketeering activity does not require two 
schemes, but instead, requires two predicate acts "within a single scheme that were 
related and that amounted to, or threatened the likelihood of, continued criminal activ­
ity." Id. at 237. 
21. United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748,759-60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
924 (1990); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 859 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986); United.States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d 
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ally commit those acts.22 A minority of the United States courts of 
appeals, however, holds that a defendant may be convicted of a 
RICO conspiracy only if the defendant personally agreed to commit 
two or more predicate acts.23 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certi­
orari on this conflict, and Justice White dissented on numerous oc­
casions.24 Justice White argued that if the majority's position is . 
correct, then "Congress' intent is being frustrated in those circuits 
which adhere to the narrower view of RICO conspiracy;"25 if the 
majority is incorrect, then the "defendants are being exposed to 
conviction for behavior Congress did not intend to reach under 
[section] 1962(d)."26 
B. 	 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.: The United States Supreme 
Court's First Look at Section 1964(c) 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CO.27 for two reasons. First, the Sedima Court 
noted the importance of RICO civil litigation caused by its rapid 
expansion in the early 1980s.28 Second, the Sedima Court wanted 
to resolve a division among the United States courts of appeals con-
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985); United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1529-31 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984). 
22. See supra note 2l. 
23. United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
831 (1984); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 
U.S. 	1011 (1983). 
24. Pryba v. United States, 498 U.S. 924 (White, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 
900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1990); Neopolitan v. United States, 479 U.S. 940 (White, J., 
dissenting), denying cert. to 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986); Adams v. United States, 474 
U.S. 971 (White, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 759 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1985); Morris v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 819, denying cert. to 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1984). 
25. Adams, 474 U.S. at 973 (White, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 759 F.2d 1099. 
26. Id. A recent law review article suggests that the Supreme Court resolve this 
disagreement in the following manner: 
On the basis of the absence of a provision directly requiring proof of personal 
agreement and the express statement that RICO is to be liberally construed, it 
appears that the correct approach is the one taken by the majority. This is 
because it follows the language of the statute by not creating a requirement 
that is not contained within the language of the statute. In addition, it further 
effectuates the purpose of the Act by providing the government with a more 
effective tool to deal with organized crime. 
Jeanette Cotting, Note, RICO's Conspiracy Agreement Requirement: A Matter of Se­
mantics?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 725, 753-54 (1993). 
27. 	 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
28. Id. at 485-86 & nn.5-6. Prior to Sedima, district courts had rendered 270 
RICO decisions. Of those, only three percent were decided in the 1970s, two percent in 
1980, seven percent in 1981, 13% in 1982,33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984. Id. at 481 n.1 
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cerning what type of injury could be caused "by reason of" a RICO 
violation.29 While the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re­
quired a "racketeering injury,"30 the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits rejected such a limitation.31 
1. The Background of Sedima 
In 1979, Sedima agreed to enter into a joint venture with Imrex 
to provide aircraft and aircraft electronic parts to a NATO sub con­
tractor.32 Sedima's role was to secure the orders and to import the 
parts from Imrex who supplied the parts from the United States.33 
Sedima had secured $8.5 million worth of orders, and Imrex had 
filled approximately eight million dollars worth of the orders, when 
Sedima filed suit against Imrex.34 
Sedima alleged that Imrex had overstated purchase prices and 
produced fraudulent billing charges.35 The complaint alleged sev­
eral common-law counts, including breach of contract and breach of 
a fiduciary duty.36 It also alleged two violations of section 1962(c) 
based on the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud as well as a viola­
tion of the RICO conspiracy provision, section 1962(d). Based 
upon these violations, Sedima sought treble damages and attorney's 
fees under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).37 
The district court dismissed Sedima's RICO claims for failing 
to allege a "RICO-type injury."38 Such an injury, the district court 
explained, arises in only two situations. In one situation, a "RICO­
(citing REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF 
CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 55 (1985». 
29. Id. at 484-86. 
30. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 
U.S. 479 (1985). By requiring a "racketeering injury," the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit had attempted to develop a doctrine to limit the scope of RICO. 
"Given the general purpose of the RICO legislation, the uses to which private civil 
RICO has been put have been extraordinary, if not outrageous." Id. at 487. 
31. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 
1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 
F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 473 U.S. 922, adhered to in relevant 
part, 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); and Alcorn 
County, Miss. V. United States Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984). 
32. Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 483 (1985). 
33. Id. at 483-84. 




38. Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 
741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
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type injury" occurs "where 'a civil RICO defendant's ability to 
harm the plaintiff is enhanced by the infusion of money from a pat­
tern of racketeering acts into the enterprise."'39 In the other situa­
tion, it occurs "where the plaintiff is forced to compete with an 
enterprise that has gained an unfair market advantage through the 
infusion of funds from racketeering activity."40 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis­
missal of Sedima's RICO claims.41 It stated that an alleged injury 
must be "different in kind from that occurring as a result of the 
predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate 
acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to 
deter."42 Because the Clayton (antitrust) Act served as a model for 
RICO, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, a "racke­
teering injury" would be analogous with the Clayton Act's require­
ment of an "antitrust injury."43 
2. The Sup:reme Court's Reversal in Sedima44 
The Sedima Court held that section 1964(c) does not require a 
39. Id. at 965 (quoting Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 209 
(E.D. Mich. 1981)). 
40. Id. (citing North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 
(M.D. Ill. 1980)). 
These two theories on "RICO-type" injuries closely follow thewording of Senator 
Hruska's original RICO bills. The Senator's first bill utilized antitrust laws to prohibit 
"the use of intentionally and deliberately unreported income derived from one line of 
business in another line of business." S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); see 113 
CONGo REc. 17999 (1967). The Senator's second bill "prohibit[ed] the investment in 
legitimate business enterprises of income derived from specified criminal activities." S. 
2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); see 113 CONGo REc. 17999 (1967). 
41. Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 
479 (1985) 
42. Id. at 496. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also held that a civil 
suit under section 1964(c) may proceed only if the defendant has been convicted of a 
RICO violation. Id. 
43. Id. at 495. The United States Supreme Court pronounced the "antitrust in­
jury" requirement in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
The Brunswick Court held that "[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say 
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that 
which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Id. at 489. 
RICO, in fact, adopted several civil remedies developed in the antitrust field. 
These included investigative demands, 18 U.S.c. § 1968 (1988), prohibitory injunctions, 
18 U.S.c. § 1964(b) (1988), and the issuing of orders of divestment or dissolution, 18 
U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1988). 
44. Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The Sedima Court also 
overruled the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's holding that a RICO civil 
action may proceed only after a criminal conviction. Id. at 493. The Court held that the 
term "violation" in § 1964(c) refers not to a conviction, but to acts which are 
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"racketeering injury."4s Instead, the Court adopted the following, 
literal interpretation of the statute: "A plaintiff only has standing if 
... he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct 
constituting the violation."46 
The Court outlined, as an example, the conduct which consti­
tutes a violation of section 1962(c). "A violation of [section] 
1962(c) ... requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a 
pattern (4) of racketeering activity."47 Therefore, Sedima stands for 
the proposition that the compensable injury in a RICO civil action 
based upon section 1962(c) "necessarily is the harm caused by pred­
icate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern" when the acts 
are committed "in connection with the conduct of an enterprise."48 
The Court did not, however, outline the elements of a RICO 
civil action based upon section 1962(d). In fact, Sedima's section 
1962(d) claim was never addressed by the Court. Presumably, the 
Court saw no need to address the conspiracy claim49 because if 
Sedima had proven the commission of "a pattern of racketeering 
activity," then a conspiratorial agreement would have been 
inferable.50 
Though broadly interpreting RICO civil standing, the Sedima 
Court did recognize the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's 
underlying concern for the need to limit standing in the RICO con­
"chargeable," "punishable," or "indictable" under section 1961(1). Id. at 488-89. 
Furthermore, the Sedima Court found no support in the legislative history of RICO for 
the Second Circuit's holding. Id. at 489-90. In fact, the Court held that such a 
requirement of a conviction would impede Congress' underlying policy of stopping the 
infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business because "[p]rivate attorney 
general provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps." Id. 
at 493. 
45. [d. at 500. 
46. [d. at 496. The Court relied upon RICO's Liberal Construction Provision 
which provides that "[t]he provisions of this title ... shall be liberally construed." 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970) 
(current version at 18 U.S.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
47. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (footnote omitted). 
48. Id. at 497. The Court viewed this interpretation as more consistent with 
RICO's principles than the interpretation of the Second Circuit. Id. at 497-98. See 
supra note 46; see also United States v. Thrkette, 452 U.S. 576,586-87 (1981). 
49. In Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, 978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992), the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed this omission of the Sedima Court. 
The Seventh Circuit concluded that "there was no need to address standing to raise a 
§ 1962(d) claim, because if a plaintiff has standing to bring a § 1962(c) claim he neces­
sarily has standing to bring a § 1962(d) claim." Id. at 349. Moreover, held the Seventh 
Circuit, "the Court was going only so far as it needed to decide the case before it." Id. 
50. Id. 
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text.51 The Sedima Court, therefore, adopted the limitation utilized 
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Cir­
cuit had held that "'[a] defendant who violates section 1962 is not 
liable for treble damages to everyone he might have injured by 
other conduct, nor is the defendant liable to those who have not 
been injured."'52 
By adopting this holding, the Sedima Court fostered a new se­
ries of appellate court decisions concerning the scope of proximate 
causation in the RICO context.53 RICO proximate causation was 
not addressed again by the United States Supreme Court until its 
1992 Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. decision.54 
. 3. The Sedima Dissent 
Justice Marshall wrote the dissent in which Justices Brennan, 
Blackmun, and Powell joined.55 Justice Marshall argued that by al­
lowing standing for injuries caused by the predicate acts of section 
1961, the majority was supplanting many state common law reme­
51. The Sedima Court stated that "[w]e nonetheless recognize that, in its private 
civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original concep­
tion of its enactors . . .. Though sharing the doubts of the Court of Appeals about this 
increasing divergence, we cannot agree with either its diagnosis or its remedy." Sedima, 
473 U.S. at 500. 
52. Id. at 496-97 (quoting Haroco, Inc. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 
F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985». 
53. Several circuits interpreted the Sedima language to grant standing only when 
an injury directly flows from the predicate acts. Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926 (11th 
Cir. 1987); Marshall & Illsey mst Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1987); Nodine v. 
Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987); Town of Kearney v. Hudson Meadows Urban 
Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987). 
Another group of circuits viewed the direct-injury requirement as overly restric­
tive. They adopted a more traditional view of proximate causation requiring factual 
and legal causation. Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988); Brandenburg v. 
Speidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988); Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished itself as the only circuit 
interpreting Sedima to require only factual causation. Bankers Trust Corp. v. Rhoades, 
859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989). 
In Employers' RICO Liability for the Wrongful Discharge of Their Employees, 68 
NEB. L. REV. 673 (1989), Laura Ginger argued that "the proper interpretation of the 
Sedima decision with regard to civil RICO standing would seem to be that plaintiffs 
injured either directly or indirectly by racketeering activity have standing to bring a pri­
vate civil suit under the Act." Id. at 683. 
54. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992). See infra notes 97-145 and accompanying text for the 
facts and analysis of Holmes. 
55. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that 
his dissent also applied to American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 
U.S. 606 (1985). Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. Justice Powell also wrote a separate dissent 
to emphasize his disagreement. Id. at 523 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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dies56 as well as broad areas of federal law, including securities 
law.57 Justice Marshall claimed to find no support for such an ex­
pansive reading of the statute. 
In fact, Justice Marshall concluded, the distinct lack of atten­
tion which Congress afforded to RICO's civil damages provision 
demonstrates that Congress intended a much narrower interpreta­
tion.58 Justice Marshall, following the analogy to antitrust standing, 
would have limited standing to "recovery for injury resulting from 
the confluence of events described in [section] 1962 and not merely 
from the commission of a predicate act. "59 
C. Wrongful Discharge and RICO Conspiracy Standing After 
Sedima 
The United States courts of appeals have unanimously denied 
RICO standing to wrongfully discharged employees whose suits are 
based upon RICO's substantive provisions, section 1962(a)-(c).60 
Section 1962(a)-(c) requires, the courts hold, that the alleged injury 
must result from "a pattern of racketeering activity."61 Because 
56. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501. 
57. Id. at 504. See supra note 19 for Congress' list of racketeering activities, 18 
U.S.c. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1993). 
58. Id. at 507, 518. The RICO bill passed by the United States Senate in 1970 did 
not contain a civil damages provision. In hearings before the House Judiciary Commit­
tee, however, it was suggested that the bill should include "the additional civil remedy 
of authorizing private damage suits based on ... Section 4 of the Clayton Act." Organ­
ized Crime Control Act, 1969: Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No.5 of the House 
Comm. of the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 543-44 (1970) (statement of Edward 
Wright, ABA president-elect); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 520 (statement of Represen­
tative Steiger suggesting addition of a private civil damages remedy). The Committee 
agreed, and without discussion, the provision was added. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007. 
Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan provided the only recorded objection 
to the addition of § 1964(c) during hearings before the House Judiciary Committee. 
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4007,4083 (stating that the civil damages provision "provides invitation[s] for disgrun­
tled and malicious competitors to harass innocent businessmen engaged in interstate 
commerce"). 
59. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 509. 
60. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1993); Kramer v. 
Bachan Aerospace Corp., 912 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 
F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 332 (1991); O'Malley v. O'Neill, 887 
F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990); Shearin v. E.F. Hutton 
Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 
527 (2d Cir. 1989); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988); 
Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1987). 
61. "The Supreme Court has held that in order for a litigant to establish standing 
to bring a suit under § 1964(c) of RICO, the injury alleged must be a result of a viola­
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wrongful discharge is not a "racketeering activity," wrongfully dis­
charged employees must base their complaints upon section 
1962( d). The results have ·been mixed. 
1. 	 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Grants RICO 
Standing Based on Section 1962(d) 
In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in 
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. 62 that a wrongfully discharged 
employee could have standing to sue under section 1964(c) if the 
complaint was based on section 1962(d).63 The plaintiff, Shearin, 
alleged that Hutton Trust was involved in a scheme of charging fees 
to customers of Hutton, Inc. for trust services which were never 
performed.64 In order to effectuate this scheme, Shearin claimed, 
she was hired to give Hutton Trust the appearance of a genuine 
trust company. When she threatened to disclose the alleged impro­
prieties, however, she was abruptly dismissed.65 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Shearin that 
"[n]othing in Sedima forecloses the possibility" that predicate acts 
for conspiracy standing may be traditional overt conspiracy acts 
rather than section 1961(1) racketeering activity.66 The Sedima 
Court, according to Shearin, had analyzed only violations of section 
1962(a)-(c), and had focused its analysis on refuting the notion of a 
"racketeering injury."67 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
agreed with Sedima that "racketeering activity" necessarily 
amounts to predicate acts for the purpose of section 1962(a)-(c) be­
cause the language of these subsections dictates that a violation oc­
curs only when "a pattern of racketeering activity" has taken 
place.68 
The Shearin court distinguished section 1962(d), however, be­
cause it does not contain the words "racketeering activity." The 
tion of § 1962." Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985». 
62. 	 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989). 
63. Id. at 1169-70. Four district courts had previously granted RICO standing to 
wrongfully discharged employees. Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988); 
Komm v. McFliker, 662 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Mo. 1987); Acampora v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 635 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1986); Callan v. State Chern. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619 
(E.D. Pa. 1984). 
64. 	 Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1164. 
65. 	 Id. 
66. 	 Id. at 1169. 
67. 	 Id. 
68. 	 Id. 
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court concluded that a plaintiff may have RICO standing based on 
section 1962(d) if the alleged injury was caused by any act which 
furthers an agreement (conspiracy) to engage in a pattern of racke­
teering activity.69 Such an act, according to the Shearin court, could 
be either racketeering activity or "classic overt conspiracy acts."70 
The Shearin court added that"Sedima further indicates that classic 
conspiracy acts not only may, but should, so qualify" as predicate 
acts for subsection 1962(d).71 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on Sedima's 
interpretation of the language of section 1964(c) to conclude that 
the civil damages provision also "did not mandate that racketeering 
activity cause the harm."72 The Sedima Court had echoed the lan­
guage of section 1964(c) when it held that, in order to have stand­
ing, a person need only to have been "'injured in his business or 
property by conduct constituting the [RICO] violation."'73 Thus, 
the Shearin court found that neither section 1964(c) nor section 
1962(d) required the commission of "racketeering activity."74 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Shearin 
had standing because her "hiring and firing plausibly constitute 
overt acts that not only would establish a conspiracy, but in this 
case were allegedly essential to it."75 
2. 	 The Majority of the United States Courts of Appeals 
Deny RICO Standing Based on Section 1962(d)76 
Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc.77 has been cited as a 
69. 	 Id. 
70. 	 [d. 
71. 	 [d. 
72. 	 [d. 
73. 	 [d. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985». 
74. 	 Id. 
75. Id. at 1168. See Frederic Brooks, RICO Conspiracy Standing After Sedima, 25 
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 423, 449 (agreeing with the Shearin court's holding because 
"neither the RICO statute, congressional intent, nor Sedima suggest that such dis­
charged employees may not bring a RICO conspiracy suit"). 
76. Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991); Hecht v. Commerce 
Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990); Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp., 
912 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988); Morast v. Lance, 807 
F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987). . 
77. 897 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990). Hecht alleged that he ·discovered his supervisors 
"forging customer signatures ... , billing customers for fabricated or improperly con­
firmed orders, and disregarding subscription cancellation requests." [d. at 22. When he 
demanded an end to these practices, Hecht was allegedly told to participate or be fired. 
When he refused to participate, he was terminated for insubordination. Id. 
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leading case denying RICO standing to wrongfully discharged em­
ployees.78 The Hecht court did not agree with Shearin that "any 
overt act in furtherance of [a RICO] conspiracy" can be the basis 
for standing in a RICO civil action based on section 1962(d).79 The 
Hecht court held that "Congress did not deploy RICO as an instru­
ment against all unlawful acts. It targeted only predicate acts cata­
logued under section 1961(1)."80 The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit opined that RICO's "purpose ... is to target RICO 
activities, and not other conduct. "81 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Reddy v. Litton 
Industries, Inc.,82 addressed the resulting conflict between Hecht 
and Shearin. The Reddy court noted that the facts of Shearin were 
unique. In Shearin, the plaintiff's hiring and firing were essential to 
the alleged conspiracy.83 The Reddy court held that Shearin should 
be "construed narrowly," and that the Reddy facts were more simi­
lar to those of Hecht.84 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
then concluded that "[i]f ... there is any doctrinal inconsistency 
between Hecht and Shearin, we prefer the rule of Hecht."8s 
In Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit joined the majority.86 The plaintiff, Miranda, 
claimed she was discharged for refusing to participate in the de­
fendants' conspiracy to obstruct a federal investigation.87 The Mi­
randa court took a federalist approach in denying standing. The 
court held that "[RICO] cannot be used as a surrogate for local law, 
as a panacea to redress every instance of man's inhumanity to man, 
or as a terrible swift sword capable of righting all wrongs of a trou­
bled world. "88 
78. See Miranda, 948 F.2d at 48; Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295 (9th Cir. 1990). 
79. Hecht, 897 F.2d at 25. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff, Reddy, alleged that he was termi­
nated after reporting a bribery within Litton Industries to his superiors. Reddy then 
refused to participate in Litton's cover-up of the illegal bribes. Id. at 293. 
83. Id. at 295. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text for a full discussion 
of Shearin. 
84. Reddy, 912 F.2d at 295. 
85. Id. 
86. 948 F.2d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 1991). 
87. Id. at 43. 
88. Id. at 49. Nevertheless, the Miranda court still recognized Shearin's factual 
distinction despite concluding that it preferred the denial of standing. Id. at 48 n.9. 
Compare the Miranda court's holding with Justice Marshall's dissent in Sedima, dis­
cussed in supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
1994) RICO LAW-WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND CONSPIRACY 379 
In Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp.,89 the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit added another dimension to the majority's 
analysis. The Sixth Circuit held that because "[t]he government, 
not the plaintiff, was the target of defendant's scheme to ship defec­
tive military hardware" that the plaintiff did not have standing.90 In 
Kramer, the plaintiff had allegedly been fired for blowing the whis­
tle on his employer by reporting to the United States Defense De­
partment that the defendant was manufacturing defective parts.91 
In Morast v. Lance,92 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit added a policy argument to the majority's position. The 
Morast court was faced with a claim by a bank manager allegedly 
discharged for reporting his employer's banking violations and co­
operating with an investigation of the bank.93 The Morast court re­
futed the argument that providing the bank manager with a RICO 
remedy would deter RICO violations.94 Instead, the Morast court 
opined that providing a remedy in this situation would only benefit 
the plaintiff:95 Absent a deterrent effect, the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit held that Congress did not intend to provide a 
RICO remedy.96 
The majority of the United States Courts of Appeals, there­
fore, provide the following five justifications for denying RICO 
standing to a wrongfully discharged employee in a suit based upon 
section 1962(d): (1) wrongful discharge is not a RICO predicate 
act; (2) Shearin should be construed narrowly; (3) RICO does not 
89. 912 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 199O). 
90. Id. at 156 (emphasis added). The Kramer court held that plaintiffs injury 
resulted from defendant's decision to fire him and not from a RICO conspiracy. [d. 
91. Id. at 152. 
92. 807 F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987). 
93. Id. at 929. 
94. Id. at 933. 

. 95. Id. 

96. Id. at 929. In Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1988), 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted this policy approach differently. 
The Cullom court held that: 
the policy reasons for allowing whistle blowers, as opposed to non-partici­
pants, to sue under RICO are more persuasive because in addition to exposing 
the illegal scheme to the public by bringing a private suit, the whistle blower 
often times exposes the illegal scheme to the authorities and cooperates with 
the authorities, thus 'strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering 
process.' 
[d. at 1217 (quoting the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073 
(statement of findings and purposes}). Nevertheless, the Cullom court denied standing 
for either a whistle blower or an employee discharged for refusing to participate in an 
illegal scheme because neither type of plaintiff has injuries which flow from RICO pred­
icate acts. Id. 
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displace local law; (4) wrongfully discharged employees are not the 
targets of RICO conspiracies; and (5) providing a remedy would 
not deter RICO violations. 
II. PRINCIPAL CASES 
A. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.97 
1. Background to Holmes 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") was cre­
ated as a private, nonprofit corporation.98 Most broker-dealers reg­
istered under section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
were required to be members of SIPC.99 The corporation was 
charged with protecting the customers of broker-dealers by seeking 
a protective decree in federal district court whenever it determined 
that a member "'has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its 
obligations to customers."'lOO 
In July of 1981, SIPC sought decrees protecting the customers 
of Joseph Sebag, Inc. and First State Securities Corporation 
("FSSC").lOl The district courts entered the requested decrees and 
appointed trustees to liquidate the broker-dealers.102 As a result of 
the liquidations, SIPC had to advance nearly $13 million to cover 
claims against FSSC and Sebag by their customers.103 
SIPC, and the trustees of FSSC and Sebag, subsequently 
brought suit against seventy-five defendants in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California.104 The plain­
tiffs alleged that from 1964 through July 1981 the defendants had 
"manipulated stock of six companies by making unduly optimistic 
97. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992). 
98. Id. at 1314 (1992) (noting that the Securities Investor Protection Act 
("SIPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988), authorized the formation of SIPC). 
99. Id. (noting that the manner of registration of brokers and dealers is codified 
as 15 u.s.c. § 780(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and the membership requirement is codi­
fied as 15 U.S.c. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A) (1988». 
100. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.c. § 78eee(a)(3) (1988». 
101. Id. 
102. Id. (noting that 15 U.S.c. § 78eee(b)(3) (1988) requires a trustee be ap­
pointed and charged with liquidating the member's business). 
103. Id. at 1315 (Trustees are required to return all securities registered in specific 
customers' names. 15 U.S.c. §§ 78fff-2(c)(2), 78fff(a)(1)(A), 78111(3) (1988). All securi­
ties not so registered must be combined with cash found in customers' accounts and 
divided ratably to satisfy customers' claims against the broker-dealer. 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78fff-2(b), § 78 fff(a)(I)(B) (1988). SIPC must advance up to $500,000 per customer 
to the extent that the broker-dealer's funds are inadequate to meet the claims. 15 
U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (1988» . 
. 104. Id. 
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statements about their prospects and by continually selling small 
numbers of shares to create the appearance of a liquid market."105 
In July 1981, the plaintiffs alleged, the market recognized defend­
ants' fraudulent activities and the price of the manipulated stocks 
plummeted.106 Because FSSC and Sebag had bought substantial 
amounts of the manipulated stock, the plaintiffs claim that this de­
cline caused the broker-dealers' financial difficulties, resulted in the 
broker-dealers' liquidation, and triggered SIPC's duty to advance 
funds. 107 
The complaint alleged that Holmes participated in this scheme 
by making false statements about "one of the six companies, Aero 
System, Inc., of which he was an officer, director, and major share­
holder."108 The complaint also alleged that Holmes simulated a liq­
uid market in one of the other six companies, Bunnington 
Corporation, by selling small amounts of stoCk.109 
The complaint charged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, thereby 
entitling SIPC and the trustees to treble damages under section 
1964(c). It stated that the conspirators' violations of section lO(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,110 SEC Rule lOb-S,ll1 and 
the mail and wire fraud statutes112 amounted to a "pattern of racke­
teering activity. "113 
After five years of litigation,114 the district court granted 
Holmes summary judgment for two reasons. First,· the court held 
that SIPC did not meet the standing requirements of section lO(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act nor of SEC Rule 10b-S.115 Second, 







110. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)). 
111. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1991)). 
112. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
113. Id. at 1315 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.c. §§ 1962,1961(1) and (5) (1988 & Supp. V 
1993)). 
114. Id. at 1315 & n.4 (citing Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 
F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1986) (Vigman II); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 
764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985) (Vigman I)). 
115. Id. at 1315. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 
(1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 
956 (1952). SIPC fails the Birnbaum test which requires a plaintiff to be a purchaser or 
seller of a security. 
116. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1315. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.117 On 
the first question, it held that a section 1964(c) RICO action has its 
own independent standing requirements and does not incorporate 
those of other statutes.llS On the second question, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court mistakenly 
looked at the causal relationship of Holmes' action alone in relation 
to the alleged injuries. It held that Holmes could be found respon­
sible for the actions of his co-conspirators, and therefore, the causal 
relation required reexamination.119 
Holmes' petition of certiorari presented two issues: 1) did 
SIPC have a right to sue under RICO? and 2) could Holmes be 
held responsible for the actions of his co-conspirators?120 The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the first issue 
alone.121 
2. The Holmes Opinion 
In Holmes, the United States Supreme Court defined civil 
RICO standing. In the late 1980s, lower courts had accepted proxi­
mate causation as a standing requirement for section 1964(c), but 
their efforts had demonstrated the concept's ambiguity.122 The 
Holmes Court held that the "by reason of' language of section 
1964(c) must require more than "but for" causation.l23 Factual cau­
sation, according to the Court, could not have been Congress' sole 
intention because" 'any attempt to impose responsibility on such a 
basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts."'124 The 
Holmes Court, therefore, established the rule that a RICO plaintiff 
has been injured "by reason of a [section] 1962 violation" only if 
there exists "some direct relation between the injury asserted and 
the injurious conduct alleged."l25 
117. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 
1990), affd, 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1991). 
118. Id. at 1465-67. 
119. Id. at 1467-69. 
120. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1316. The Holmes Court assumed that the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held that Holmes could be held responsible for 
the act of his co-conspirators. Id. n.6. 
121. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 499 U.S. 974 (1991). 
122. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317 n.ll (citing 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1988». See supra 
note 53 and accompanying text for the various interpretations of RICO proximate cau­
sation given by the United States courtS of appeals. 
123. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1316. 
124. Id. at 1316 n.10 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984». 
125. Id. at 1318. A recent Note suggested that "Holmes should not be misread to 
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To arrive at this conclusion, the Holmes Court held that section 
1964(c) of RICO was modeled after the "by reason of" language in 
section four of the Clayton ACt.126 The Clayton Act's civil damages 
provision provides remedies for injuries caused by violations of an­
titrust laws.127 The United States Supreme Court had held in Asso­
ciated General Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters128 that the antitrust 
civil damages provision contained a direct-injury requirement.129 
The Holmes Court held, therefore, that because the Ninety-first 
stand for (nor endorse) any type of bright-line test requiring a 'direct injury' for RICO 
standing." Daniel J. Shapiro, Note, Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corpora­
tion: Proximate Cause Dims the Bright- Lines of RICO Standing, 53 LA. L. REV. 1911, 
1913 (1993). 
126. The Supreme Court has observed the similarities between the two civil ac­
tion provisions on three previous occasions. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317. See Agency 
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1987) (holding that 
the Clayton Act's four year statute of limitations for civil suits is applicable to RICO 
civil suits); ShearsonlAmerican Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987) 
(holding that RICO claims, like antitrust claims, are subject to the Federal Arbitration 
Act); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (rejecting a "racketeering 
injury" comparable to an "antitrust injury" requirement for civil suits). 
127. The Clayton Act provides that "any person who shall be injured in his busi­
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor 
in any district court of the United States ... and shall recover threefold the damages by 
him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.c. 
§ 4 (1988). Compare 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1988) with 15 U.S.c. § 4 (1988); see supra 
note 4 for the text of 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1988). 
128. 459 U.S. 519, 529 (1983). 
129. Section 4 of the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914. It borrowed language 
from § 7 of the Sherman Act passed in 1890. The Supreme Court argues that prior to 
1914 lower courts had read a direct-injury requirement into § 7, and that by adopting 
the statute's language, Congress was adopting this "'judicial gloss that avoided a simple 
literal interpretation.'" Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1317 (quoting Associated Gen. Contrac­
tors, 459 U.S. at 533-34 & n.29). 
In Standing Doctrine in Antitrust Damage Suits, 1890-1975: Statutory Exegesis, In­
novation, and the Influence ofDoctrinal History, John F. Hart contends that the conven­
tional account of antitrust standing, including a direct-injury requirement and other 
forms of restrictions, "is considerably incorrect." 59 TENN. L. REV. 191, 193-94 (1992) 
[hereinafter Hart]. Professor Hart states that until the 1950s courts generally followed 
the ordinary meaning of the antitrust broad statutory language. Id. In fact, Hart con­
tinues, only Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1910), used the test prior 
to the Clayton Act's enactment in 1914 although three other cases in that time period 
are also cited as examples of the test. Hart, supra, at 194,209-14. See Ames v. AT&T 
Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909); Corey v. Boston Ice Co., 207 F. 465 (D. Mass. 
1913); Corey v. Independent Ice Co., 207 F. 459 (D. Mass. 1913). Hart, supra, at 208 nn. 
107-08. Professor Hart's historical survey of antitrust standing finds that only a handful 
of decisions between 1915 and 1950 invoked a direct-injury test. Id. at 218-24. Only in 
the 1950s, suggests Hart, did the direct-injury test become generally accepted as a 
means of applying policy to standing analysis. Id. at 232-33. And only in the 1970s, 
points out Hart, was the direct-injury test accepted as the historical rule of antitrust 
standing. Id. at 252-54. 
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Congress used the same words in the RICO provision that were 
found in the antitrust provision, "we can only assume it intended 
them to have the same meaning that courts had already given 
them."130 
The Holmes Court then adopted from Associated General Con­
tractors the following three reasons why a direct-injury requirement 
was essential to the "by reason of" language: 
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to 
ascertain the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to the 
violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors.131 Second, 
quite apart from problems of proving factual causation, recogniz­
ing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt 
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs re­
moved at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to ob­
viate the risk of mUltiple recoveries.132 And, finally, the need to 
grapple with these problems is simply unjustified by the general 
interest in deterring injurious conduct, since directly injured vic­
tims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private 
attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon 
suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.133 
Based on these reasons, the Court held that SIPC's injuries were 
not proximately caused by the conspirators' conduct.t34 
Analyzing SIPC's claim under the first reason for a direct-in­
jury requirement, the Court found that "the link is too remote be­
tween the stock manipulation alleged and the customers' harm, 
being purely contingent on the harm suffered by the broker-deal­
ers. "135 It was the broker-dealers who were directly injured by the 
conspirators' conduct and SIPC was subsequently injured only be­
cause the broker-dealers failed to meet their obligations to their 
customers.t36 The Court labelled the broker-dealers' financial diffi­
culties as an "intervening insolvency connect[ing] the conspirators' 
130. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 
756 (1979), and Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427,428 (1973), 
to demonstrate the validity of applying the same meaning to statutory language bor­
rowed in haec verba from other statutes). 
131. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
542-43 (1983)). 
132. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 543-44; Blue Shield v. 
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473-75 (1982); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 
(1972)). 
133. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 541-42). 
134. Id. at 1319. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
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acts to the losses."137 Because SIPC's injury is less than direct, the 
Court held that allowing SIPC's claim to proceed would require the 
difficult determination of what portion of the injury was factually 
caused by the conspiracy as opposed to other factors.138 As exam­
ples, the Court suggested that portions of the injury could have 
been caused by the broker-dealers' poor business practices or fail­
ure to anticipate market changes.139 
Aside from this factual causation problem, the Court held that 
the second reason for a· direct-injury requirement also demon­
strated that SIPC should not recover under section 1964(c).140 If 
indirectly-injured plaintiffs could recover under RICO, then district 
courts would be faced with finding methods to apportion damages 
in such a fashion as to prevent duplicative recoveries.141 This prob­
lem arose in Holmes because the broker-dealers remained liable to 
SIPC via the nonpurchasing customers. If SIPC recovered indepen­
dently, and then received indemnification from the broker-dealers, 
then it would have received an unjustified windfal1.142 
Finally, the Holmes Court noted that the directly-injured par­
ties also had a suit against the conspirators which could lead to re­
imbursement for the indirectly-injured plaintiffs' alleged injuries.143 
The Court stated that a suit by indirectly-injured victims could be 
an attempt to circumvent the priority which should be afforded to 
directly-injured victims.l44 
137. Id. Associated General Contractors involved an analogous factual situation. 
The California State Council of Carpenters and the Carpenters 46 Northern Counties 
Conference Board alleged that they were injured by the antitrust activities of Associ­
ated General Contractors of California, Inc. The Carpenters claimed that Associated 
coerced certain third parties to use only nonunion contractors and subcontractors, 
thereby causing injury to the unions. The Court held, however, that any injuries suf­
fered by the unions were only "an indirect result of whatever harm may have been 
suffered by 'certain' construction contractors and subcontractors." Associated Gen. 
Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 541 (1983). 
138. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1320. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Court stated that 
"[e]ven the most lengthy and expensive trial could not, in the final analysis, cope with 
the problems of double recovery." Id. at 264. 
142. The Holmes Court limited its evaluation of this reason for the direct-injury 
requirement to the following sentence: "Assuming that an appropriate assessment of 
factual causation could be made out, the district court would then have to find some 
way to apportion the possible respective recoveries by the broker-dealers and the cus­
tomers, who would otherwise each be entitled to recover the full treble damages." 
Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1320. 
143. Id. at 1320. 
144. Id. at 1320-21. 
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The Court concluded that it was not giving the statute an illib­
eral construction. Rather, the Court held, the nonpurchasing cus­
tomers "are not proper plaintiffs." By not allowing suits by 
indirectly-injured victims the Court held that it was keeping the 
doors closed to "'massive and complex damages litigation[, which 
would] not only burde[n] the courts, but also undermin[e] the effec­
tiveness of treble damages suitS."'145 
B. 	 RICO Conspiracy Standing After Holmes 
1. 	 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Joins the 
Minority 
In Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.,146 the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to concur 
with the Shearin court's analysis.147 The Schiffels court held that 
"since RICO conspiracy does not require the actual commission of 
a predicate act, it follows that the act causing plaintiff's injury need 
not be a predicate act of racketeering."148 Furthermore, the Schif­
fels court opined, Congress could have limited section 1964's reme­
dies to only those persons injured by predicate acts, but it did 
145. Id. at 1321 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545) (altera­
tions in original). Observers have noted that "[t]here is a growing sentiment that ... 
[RICO], which was 'created to help fight organized crime, is now being used primarily 
by private individuals and corporations trying to extract large damage awards from le­
gitimate businesses.'" Ginger, supra note 53, at 673 (quoting Diamond, Steep Rise Seen 
in Private Use of Federal Racketeering Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1988, at AI). 
Because the Court held that SIPC's injuries were not proximately caused by de­
fendant's RICO violation, it declined the opportunity to rule on whether every plaintiff 
using securities fraud as a RICO predicate act must be either a purchaser or seller. 
Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 132l. 
146. 978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992). 
147. Id. at 348. "[T]he approach expounded in Shearin is the correct approach 
because it is consistent with RICO's unambiguous language and with traditional con­
cepts of conspiracy law." [d. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text for a full 
discussion of Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989). 
148. Schiffels, 978 F.2d. at 348-49. The Schiffels court observed that § 1962(d) 
targets "the agreement to violate RICO's substantive provisions, not the actual viola­
tions themselves." [d. at 348 (citing United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 500 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 54 (1991); Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 
1162, 1169 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Angi~lo. 847 F.2d 956. 964 (1st Cir.). cert. 
denied. 488 U.S. 852 and cert. denied. 488 U.S. 928 (1988); United States v. Phillips. 664 
F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981). cert. denied. 457 U.S. 1136 and cert. denied. 459 U.S. 906 
(1982». 
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had dismissed Schiffels' 
complaint because she was not injured by any predicate act of racketeering. Schiffels v. 
Kemper Fin. Servs .• Inc.• 767 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Ill. 1991). rev 'd. 978 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
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not.149 
The plaintiff, Schiffels, alleged that she was fired for attempting 
to blow the whistle on a scheme by her supervisor to defraud two 
mutual funds. She claimed that the scheme was conducted through­
out most of 1987, and was followed by a conspiracy to cover up the 
fraudulent activities.150 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir­
cuit, nevertheless, distinguished Schiffels from Shearin151 by relying 
on the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes that the injury must be 
directly caused by the conduct constituting the violation.152 SchiJ­
Jels held that a plaintiff has standing to sue under RICO if the 
"complaint alleges an injury to her business or property proxi­
mately caused by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy to vio­
late RICO, even though the overt act is not a predicate act required 
in a RICO pattern."153 
Schiffels was not fired until February 15, 1990, after several in­
vestigations had been conducted into her allegations.154 The Sev­
enth Circuit found, therefore, that by the time she was fired the 
alleged fraudulent scheme had ended. "[A] fair reading of Schif­
fels' complaint indicates only that she was fired in retaliation for 
attempting to disclose the fraudulent scheme, not to further it or 
prevent its disclosure. "155 Her injury may have been factually 
caused by the conspiracy, but the injury was not proximately 
caused.156 Therefore, even though the Schiffels court explicitly 
agreed with the analysis of Shearin, it reached a different result be­
cause of the facts alleged. 
2. 	 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Joins the 
Majority 
In Bowman v. Western Auto Supply CO.,157 the Court of Ap­
peals for the Eighth Circuit joined the majority of circuits denying 
149. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 350. Compare Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948 
F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991), in which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that 
allowing a § 1964(c) remedy for a traditional overt conspiracy act would be "tanta­
mount to rewriting the statute." Id. at 48; see supra note 86-88 and accompanying text. 
150. Schiffels, 978 F.2d at 346-47. 
151. The Seventh Circuit noted, in dictum, that Shearin had been directly-injured 
by the conspiracy to violate RICO. Id. at 351. 
152. Only "[a] person directly injured by an overt act in furtherance of a RICO 
conspiracy has been injured 'by reason or the conspiracy." Id. at 349 (emphasis added). 
153. Id. at 351. 
154. Id. at 347. 
155. Id. at 353. 
156. Id. at 351. 
157. 985 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993). 
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RICO standing to wrongfully discharged employees. Bowman al­
leged that he had discovered Western Auto Supply Company charg­
ing its merchandise suppliers for advertising and promotional 
services that were never performed.15S Bowman contended that he 
was subsequently discharged because he spoke out against and criti­
cized the fraudulent scheme.159 
The Bowman court held that RICO conspiracy suits require 
the same predicate acts as RICO substantive provisions.16o It con­
cluded that an injury cannot be caused "by a mere agreement to 
violate RICO .... Some overt act must occur in order to establish 
civil standing based on [section] 1962(d)."16I "Because Congress 
targeted specific types of activity in the RICO statute, rather than 
'all unlawful acts,' ... the limiting factor must be that only harm 
from a [section] 1961(1) predicate act done in furtherance of a 
RICO conspiracy will suffice to establish standing."162 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Holmes decision pro­
vided an example of how opportunities should be taken "to care­
fully delineate the types of plaintiffs who may validly bring a 
suit"163 under RICO. By holding that injuries under section 
1962(d) must flow from racketeering activity, the Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that it was effectuating the statute's purpose,164 The 
Eighth Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's approach in Schiffels 
that the direct-injury test alone prevents civil RICO liability from 
being unlimited.165 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit recognized the critique that its ap­
proach may collapse suits based on section 1962 violations into suits 
based on RICO's substantive provisions.166 The Eighth Circuit re­
sponded that "any other result would render this decision merely a 
guide to the artful pleader."167 The Eighth Circuit, therefore, 
sought to prevent civil litigants from using the threat of treble dam­
ages as bargaining leverage by alleging a conspiracy to violate 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 




163. Id. at 388. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 387. 
166. Id. at 388. 
167. Id. 
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RICO's substantive provisions.168 
III. ANALYSIS 
This Note seeks to identify Congress' intention to provide a 
civil remedy for injuries caused "by reason of" a conspiracy to vio­
late RIC0.169 It addresses this issue in the context of civil RICO 
actions brought by wrongfully discharged employees. Because the 
United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, this sec­
tion predicts what the Court would hold by analyzing RICO's un­
derlying policies and the means by which the Court has effectuated 
those policies in other contexts. The United States Supreme Court 
has handed down two decisions which are now the focus of litiga­
tion among the United States courts of appeals with respect to 
RICO civil actions based on section 1962(d). In the first decision, 
the Sedima Court outlined the elements of a section 1962(c) RICO 
violation.170 The United States courts of appeals disagree as to 
whether the Sedima analysis also applies to a suit based upon a sec­
tion 1962(d) violation. l7l 
In the second decision, the Holmes Court ruled that RICO civil 
remedies are limited to plaintiffs who are directly-injured by RICO 
violations.l72 Unlike the Sedima holding, the Holmes direct-injury 
test explicitly applies to RICO civil suits based on any violation of 
section 1962, including a RICO conspiracy. This Note, therefore, 
utilizes the Holmes decision as its nucleus for analyzing the RICO 
standing of wrongfully discharged employees. It suggests that the 
disagreement among the United States courts of appeals with re­
spect to the Sedima analysis can be reconciled by applying the 
Holmes test. 
The direct-injury test consists of three factors: (1) the remote­
ness of the plaintiff's injury; (2) the danger of duplicate recoveries 
by mUltiple plaintiffs; and (3) the deterrent effect of allowing indi­
vidual plaintiffs to recover.173 By applying the direct-injury test to 
actions brought by wrongfully discharged employees, this Note will 
168. [d. 
169. Congress set forth this intent with the following statement: "[s]ubsection (d) 
makes conspiracy to violate (a), (b) or (c) equally subject to the remedies of section[] 
... 1964." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1969). 
170. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985); see supra text ac­
companying note 47. 
171. See supra parts I.B and I1.B. 
172. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311,1318 (1992); 
see supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
173. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318; see supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. 
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conclude that the minority position among the United States courts 
of appeals should prevail. The complaints of wrongfully discharged 
employees should be able to survive a motion to dismiss. They 
should be considered "proper [RICO] plaintiffs."174 
A. 	 Are Wrongfully Discharged Employees' Damages Too Remote 
from a RICO Violation? 
The Holmes Court held that Congress did not intend to pro­
vide damages for all injuries which would not have occurred "but 
for" a defendant's RICO violation.175 As a matter of statutory con­
struction, the Court adopted this stance by analogy to antitrust 
law.176 The policy reason behind the holding, however, is more im­
portant. If the Court had adopted a theory of "but for" causation, 
then the courts would be filled with "'massive and complex dam­
ages litigation[, which would] not only burde[n] the courts, but also 
undermin[e] the effectiveness of treble-damages suits.'''177 
The Holmes Court held that "the less direct an injury is, the 
more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's 
damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, in­
dependent factors."178 In theory, this concern is especially salient 
when considering a civil action based on a RICO conspiracy. As 
the facts in United States v. Elliott179 demonstrate, the enterprise 
174. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1321. The direct-injury test is designed to distinguish 
those plaintiffs whose complaints will further Congress' goals from those whose com­
plaints will not. 
Prior to the Holmes decision, Laura Ginger concluded that "wrongful discharge is 
by definition an injury which results only indirectly from a RICO violation." Ginger, 
supra note 53, at 700. This conclusion rested on the premise that if an injury does not 
result from a predicate act then it must be indirect. Id. at 680. The Holmes test demon­
strates, however, that the direct-injury requirement is a separate and distinct test from 
the requirement of a predicate act. This Note has further argued that the predicate act 
requirement does not exist when a § 1964(c) claim is based on a RICO conspiracy be­
cause § 1962(d) does not require the actual commission of "a pattern of racketeering 
activity." See supra part I.A. Wrongful discharge, therefore, is not by definition an 
indirect injury simply because it is not a "racketeering activity." See also Brooks, supra 
note 75, at 446 (arguing that "since RICO conspiracy is a distinct offense, it is mislead­
ing to characterize the firing as an injury indirect to all RICO violations"). 
175. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1316. The Court noted, nevertheless, that the "by rea­
son of' language in § 1964(c) could be interpreted to require only "but for" causation. 
Id. 
176. 	 Id. at 1317-18; see supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
177. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1321 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983» (alterations in original). 
178. Id. at 1318 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542-43); see supra 
note 131 and accompanying text. 
179. 	 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1978). 
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theory of RICO conspiracy allows for the single prosecution of a 
large number of individuals involved in highly diversified crimes.18o 
The "enterprise" theory, therefore, provides many events to which 
RICO civil liability could be attached by private litigants as well as 
many possible intervening causes. 
The Holmes Court's refusal to adopt factual causation in RICO 
civil actions, however, does not eliminate the efficacy of suits 
brought by wrongfully discharged employees. The Schiffels court 
applied the direct-injury test to an employee who blew the whistle 
on a fraudulent scheme by her supervisor; but the court denied lia­
bility to the plaintiff because she was not discharged until after the 
scheme had ended.181 The Schiffels court concluded that the link 
between the conspiracy and the discharge was too tenuous under 
the facts alleged. 
The Schiffels court concurred in dictum, however, with the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision to grant standing 
in Shearin. In Shearin, the plaintiff alleged that her hiring and firing 
had been "essential" to the defendants' RICO conspiracy. The 
damages suffered by the plaintiff in Shearin were attributable to the 
RICO conspiracy of the plaintiff's employers. The plaintiff's claim 
in Shearin, therefore, survived a motion to dismiss.182 
The Bowman court argued that the analysis presented by the 
Shearin and Schiffels courts "would render [RICO conspiracy suits] 
merely a guide to the artful pleader."183 In a sense, this criticism is 
justified. Plaintiffs will sometimes be able to characterize their 
grievances in manners which allow their claims to survive a motion 
to dismiss. The Reddy court had been close to recognizing such a 
distinction when it held that Shearin should be narrowly construed 
and joined the majority position because of the specific facts alleged 
by the plaintiff.l84 
The Bowman court fails to realize in its analysis that proximate 
cause is first an issue for the court. "The administration of rules of 
180. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text for the facts of Elliott. 
181. For the full discussion of Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, 978 F.2d 344 
(7th Cir. 1992), see supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. 
182. For the full discussion of Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 
(3d Cir. 1989), see supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text. 
183. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir.), cen. de­
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993). 
184. Reddy v. Litton Indus., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 82-85 
and accompanying text. The facts in Reddy made it easy for the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit to side with the majority because the facts involved an employee who 
refused to participate in the employer's alleged racketeering activities. 
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law, and the determination of facts upon which there could be no 
reasonable differences of opinion is in the hands of the court. "185 
Furthermore, the artful pleaders feared by the Bowman court will 
also be subject to motions for summary judgment. If the Bowman 
court had properly applied the Holmes direct-injury test it would 
have understood that it was unnecessary to continue denying RICO 
standing to wrongfully discharged plaintiffs simply because their in­
juries were not caused by a RICO predicate act. Many of the same 
cases would be disposed of because the employees' injuries would 
be too remote from the RICO conspiracy. 
B. 	 Is There a Danger of Duplicate Recoveries in RICO Civil 
Actions Brought by Wrongfully Discharged Employees? 
The Holmes Court's second justification for the direct-injury 
test was the difficulty in "apportioning damages among plaintiffs 
removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts."186 
The Holmes Court held that "district court[s] would ... have to find 
some way to apportion the possible respective recoveries."187 The 
fear was that duplicate recoveries would result by allowing both di­
rectly and indirectly-injured plaintiffs to recover from the same de­
fendant, which would be followed by the indirectly-injured plaintiff 
also recovering from the directly-injured plaintiff. 
In Holmes, the Court denied recovery to an insurance com­
pany attempting to recover against an alleged RICO violator. The 
Court held that the broker-dealers who were insured by the com­
pany were directly-injuH~d by the defendant. If the broker-dealers 
recovered from the defendant then they would be subject to repay­
ing the insurance funds which they had been advanced. If the insur­
ance company recovered from the defendant, then it might receive 
a windfall. Not only could the insurance company receive damages 
from the defendant, but it could also receive reimbursement from 
the insured broker-dealers. 
In a wrongful discharge case, however, there is no risk of dupli­
cate recovery. The basis of the employee's damages are unrelated 
to the basis of damages to plaintiffs injured by predicate acts. Be­
cause the wrongfully discharged employee has no claim against the 
185. 	 w. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 45, at 319-20 (5th ed. 1984). 
186. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1983». 
187. 	 Id. at 1320. 
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party injured by RICO predicate acts, it would be improper to char­
acterize the employee as indirectly-injured. 
An analogous situation arose in the antitrust context of Blue 
Shield v. McCready.188 In that case, the defendant, Blue Shield, vi­
olated antitrust laws by providing reimbursement to subscribers 
treated by psychiatrists, but not to those subscribers treated by psy­
chologists. Blue Shield's policy was aimed at discouraging the use 
of psychologists.189 The Court held that because Blue Shield would 
not reimburse the plaintiff, McCready, for payments she had made 
to a psychologist that she was directly-injured "by reason of" the 
antitrust violation.190 The plaintiff had no claim against the psy­
chologists because the psychologists had only received from her the 
money they deserved for their services. The plaintiff's claim was 
against Blue Shield for failing to reimburse her as a part of the anti­
trust violation, and therefore, she was directly-injured by Blue 
Shield. 
The danger of double liability is nonexistent in wrongful dis­
charge RICO conspiracy cases. The Kramer court held, however, 
that wrongfully discharged employees could not recover under 
RICO because they are not the targets of RICO violations.191 Tar­
get-analysis appears to be justified in situations such as Holmes 
which involve the prospect of duplicative recovery, but target-anal­
ysis is not a good methodology for analyzing RICO standing be­
cause it does not distinguish between duplicate and non-duplicate 
recovery situations. Because there is no danger of wrongfully dis­
charged employees receiving duplicate recovery, their injuries 
should be considered directly caused by a RICO conspiracy. 
C. 	 Would the Granting of RICO Standing to Wrongfully 
Discharged Employees Serve RICO's Deterrent 
Function? 
Finally, the Holmes Court held that "directly injured victims 
can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attor­
neys general."192 Under the majority position, directly-injured vic­
tims would include only those plaintiffs injured by a RICO 
predicate act. This dependence on RICO predicate acts derives 
188. 	 457 U.S. 465 (1982). 
189. 	 Id. at 467-70. 
190. 	 Id. at 484. 
191. Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp .• 912 F.2d 151. 156 (6th Cir. 1990); see 
supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. 
192. 	 Holmes. 112 S. Ct. at 1318. 
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from the Sedima Court's holding and the impression that the courts 
must "carefully delineate the types of plaintiffs who may validly 
bring a suit under RICO's civil enforcement provisions."193 
The majority of the United States courts of appeals, however, 
place an unwarranted importance on the list of RICO predicate 
acts. A study of RICO's legislative history demonstrates that the 
predicate acts merely served as a means to reach the desired end of 
stopping the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized 
crime. As RICO evolved from Senator Hruska's original bill into 
its present form the list of predicate acts increased from four non­
descript activities to a diverse list of state and federal laws.194 The 
explanation for this expansion of activities is that Congress in­
tended the list to reflect the activities of organized crime. In other 
words, organized crime is as organized crime does.195 
The Miranda court argued for the majority of the United 
States courts of appeals, however, that "[RICO] cannot be used as a 
surrogate for locallaw."196 This federalism approach sounds of Jus­
tice Marshall's dissent in Sedima.l97 Justice Marshall also wanted to 
limit the scope of RICO, but the majority of the Sedima Court dis­
agreed with the "racketeering injury" approach with which he 
sought to achieve his goal. Instead, the Sedima Court held that 
remedies should be provided for injuries caused by conduct consti­
tuting a violation of section 1962.198 Not until the Holmes decision 
did the Court apply the standing limitation that a plaintiff's suit 
must serve to deter RICO violations in order to be classified as a 
direct-injury. 
A conspiracy to violate RICO was recognized as a separate 
RICO offense because Congress understood that "certain offenses 
193. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir.), cert. de­
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993). 
194. S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) included gambling, bribery, narcotics, 
and extortion as the activities which it sought to address. See 113 CONGo REC. 17999 
(1967); see supra note 19 for Congress' list of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.c. § 1961(1) 
(Supp. V 1993). Note that this list continues to be expanded and amended. In 1992, the 
United States Congress added several new offenses to the list of predicate acts. 
195. S. REp. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969). Congress defined "'racke­
teering activity' to include those crimes most often associated with organized crime, 
especially those associated with the infiltration of legitimate organizations." Id. 
196. Miranda V. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 1991); see supra notes 
86-88 and accompanying text. 
197. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479. 500 (1985) (Marshall. J., dis­
senting); see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
198. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496; see supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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produce a continuing result."l99 A RICO conspiracy is more than a 
mere adoption of state law. The agreement must be in furtherance 
of a RICO "enterprise."200 18 U.S.c. § 1962(d) does not require 
the commission of "a pattern of racketeering activity." Thus, the 
predicate acts were not intended to serve as an independent limit­
ing factor for RICO standing based upon. a RICO conspiracy 
violation. 
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue 
of whether allowing wrongfully discharged employees to bring 
RICO suits would deter RICO violations.201 It would seem, how­
ever, that employees could well serve this function. The employees 
of an "enterprise" are in a unique position to observe the activities 
of said enterprise. Their awareness of the activities of the enter­
prise in which they are employed is demonstrated by the facts of the 
several cases discussed in this Note. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States courts of appeals need to change their focus 
from the Sedima approach to the Holmes direct-injury test in order 
to evaluate RICO standing for wrongfully discharged employees. 
In one stroke, the direct-injury test will limit RICO standing while 
providing redress to "proper plaintiffs;" the direct-injury test will 
allow recovery only to employees whose discharges were suffi­
ciently linked to a RICO conspiracy. 
The proper elements of a RICO civil action based upon a vio­
lation of 18 U.S.c. § 1962(d) should be the following: (1) an agree­
ment manifested by any overt act; (2) to violate any subsection of 
section 1962(a)-(c); (3) in furtherance of the affairs of an enterprise; 
(4) which directly causes; (5) an injury to business or property. This 
interpretation does the most justice to the RICO statute. 
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199. S. REp. No. 617 at 160. 
200. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
201. "Private attorney general provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part designed to 
fill prosecutorial gaps." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493. 
